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 No Means No, But Silence Means Yes?  The Policy 
and Constitutionality of the Recent State Proposals for 
Opt-Out Organ Donation Laws 
Sara Naomi Rodriguez 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Waiting.  That is what 113,555 people in this country in need of 
life-saving organ transplants are doing right now.1  They are waiting 
for the phone call that will usher in a second chance at life.  However, 
for many of those on the organ transplant waitlist, that phone call will 
not come in time.  They will die while waiting because the demand for 
transplantable organs in this country greatly exceeds the available 
supply.2  This is particularly true for those in need of kidney trans-
plants  and the gap appears to be growing larger each year.3   
Undeniably, it is a horrific scenario.  But what is particularly frus-
trating about the shortage of transplantable organs is that the reality 
of the crisis is not reflected in public opinion surveys, which consist-
ently show that the majority of Americans are open to the idea of or-
gan donation.4  For example, in a 2005 Gallup national survey, 95% of 
those surveyed said they “support or strongly support organ dona-
tion.”5  Further, 78% of those surveyed said they “would be likely or 
very likely to have their organs donated after their death.”6  Both of 
                                                                                                                           
  J.D., 2012, Florida International University College of Law.  I would like to thank the 
following: Professor Thomas E. Baker, for helping me find my way; my parents, for their love 
and sacrifice so that anything was possible; my sister, for setting the bar high; Chris, for bringing 
fun into my life; Shari, for being my inspiration, always. 
 1 Based on data as of March 21, 2012.  The Need is Real, ORGANDONOR.GOV, 
http://organdonor.gov/index.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2012).   
 2 See 2009 OPTN/SRTR Annual Report, HRSA, http://www.ustransplant.org/annual_ 
reports/current/default.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). 
 3 See 2009 OPTN/SRTR Annual Report, supra note 2. 
 4 See 2005 National Survey of Organ and Tissue Donation Attitudes and Behaviors, THE 
GALLUP ORG., ftp://ftp.hrsa.gov/organdonor/survey2005.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2012) [hereinaf-
ter Gallup survey]; Sean R. Fitzgibbons, Cadaveric Organ Donation and Consent: A Compara-
tive Analysis of the United States, Japan, Singapore, and China, 6 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 73, 
85 (1999). 
 5 Gallup survey, supra note 4, at 3. 
 6 Id. 
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these figures represent increases from 1993 when the Gallup national 
survey was last conducted.7  Based on current death rates, these fig-
ures seem to suggest that there should be an ample, if not surplus, 
supply of transplantable organs in the United States.8  The reality, 
however, is that thousands of people die every year while waiting for 
an organ transplant that will never happen because there are just not 
enough organ donors.9  So, where is the disconnect?  If so many 
Americans are willing to donate their organs after death, why is the 
United States currently facing the greatest shortage of donor kidneys 
in a decade?10  Many believe that the disconnect stems from the ability 
of the decedent’s next of kin to intervene in the organ donation deci-
sion.11  Currently, in situations where the decedent’s organ donor sta-
tus is unknown, doctors must obtain consent from the decedent’s next 
of kin before procuring organs for transplantation.12  Unaware of what 
their deceased loved one’s wishes would have been, family members 
often “err on the side of caution” in such situations and refuse to pro-
vide consent.13  However, even where the decedent’s wishes to be an 
organ donor are known, doctors are often hesitant to procure organs 
over the objection of the decedent’s next of kin.14 
Whatever the reason for the disconnect, both the federal and 
state governments have employed various methods in an effort to in-
crease the number of organ donors in the United States, including 
revised organ donation legislation,15 government funded research,16 
and public awareness and education initiatives.17  The latest attempt 
                                                                                                                           
 7 See id. 
 8 See Christy M. Watkins, A Deadly Dilemma: The Failure of Nations’ Organ Procure-
ment Systems and Potential Reform Alternatives, 5 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 2 (2005).   
 9 See The Gap Continues to Widen, ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://www.organdonor.gov/ 
images/pdfs/gapgraph.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2012); see also The Need is Real, ORGAN 
DONOR.GOV, http://organdonor.gov/becomingdonor/index.htm (“Each day, about 79 people 
receive organ transplants.  However, 18 people die each day waiting for transplants that can't 
take place because of the shortage of donated organs.”) (last visited Mar. 21, 2012). 
 10 See Kevin B, O’Reilly, Kidney Foundation Plan Targets Financial Barriers to Donation, 
amednews.com (Feb. 23, 2009), http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2009/02/23/prsb0223.htm; 
Matt Cover, Obama Regulation Czar Advocated Removing People’s Organs Without Explicit 
Consent, CNSNEWS (Sept. 3, 2009), http://www.cnsnews.com/print/53534. 
 11 See Cover, supra note 10. 
 12 See id. 
 13 See id. at 1. 
 14 See David Orentlicher, Presumed Consent to Organ Donation: Its Rise and Fall in the 
United States, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 295, 298 (2009). 
 15 See Watkins, supra note 8, at 11. 
 16 See Grants & Research, ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://www.organdonor.gov/dtcp/ (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2011). 
 17 See Watkins, supra note 8, at 11; see also Fitzgibbons, supra note 4, at 85; see also 
About Us, UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING (UNOS), 
http://www.unos.org/about/index.php (last visited Mar. 6, 2011);  see also Awareness & Promo-
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by state law-makers has come by way of proposed “presumed con-
sent” or “opt-out” organ donation laws.18  Such laws propose to flip 
the current organ donation system in the United States, an opt-in sys-
tem, on its head by rendering all persons de facto organ donors unless 
they choose to expressly opt-out.19  The idea that presumed consent 
laws can increase organ donation rates is based on the theory that 
“more people ‘choose’ to be organ donors” when they must take af-
firmative steps to opt-out rather than opt-in.20  Further, in cases where 
the decedent’s organ donor status is unknown, some propose that pre-
sumed consent laws can help to address the issue of family consent by 
changing the dynamics of the interaction between doctors and family 
members.21  “‘The next of kin can be approached quite differently 
when the decedent’s silence is presumed to indicate a decision to do-
nate rather than when it is presumed to indicate a decision not to do-
nate.  This shift may make it easier for the family to accept organ do-
nation.’”22 
While it is commendable that the states have taken the lead in 
addressing the organ crisis, and while law-makers undoubtedly have 
the best interests of their citizens in mind, opt-out organ donation 
laws raise serious legal, ethical, and policy concerns that cannot be 
overlooked.23  Can it be that the only solution to the organ shortage 
crisis is one which poses a serious threat to our individual liberty, au-
tonomy, and privacy?  Are Americans willing to sacrifice such cher-
ished values for the benefit of the common good?  And even if the 
answers to these questions are yes, will opt-out organ donation laws 
withstand the constitutional challenges that are sure to come? 
This Comment explores the policy implications and constitution-
ality of the recent state proposals for presumed consent organ dona-
tion laws.  Part II offers an overview of the current opt-in organ dona-
                                                                                                                           
tion, Donation & Transplantation, UNOS, 
http://www.unos.org/donation/index.php?topic=awareness (last visited Mar. 6, 2011). 
 18 See Madison Park, California, New York Mull Changes to Organ Donor Laws, CNN 
HEALTH, May 10, 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-05-10/health/organ.donation.jobs.laws_ 
1_kidney-transplants-organ-transplants-donor-registry?_s=PM:HEALTH. 
 19 See Watkins, supra note 8, at 18, 20; see also Orentlicher, supra note 14, at 295; see also 
Catherine Rampell, How Can Countries Encourage Organ Donation?, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 22, 
2009, 2:12 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/22/how-can-we-encourage-organ-
donation/; see also Cover, supra note 10. 
 20 Cover, supra note 10, at 2 (“[I]n a 2003 study only 42 percent of people actively chose to 
be organ donors, while only 18 percent actively opted out when their consent was presumed.”). 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id.  
 23 Id. (“‘Another [problem] is that [presumed consent laws are] a hard sell politically. . . . 
More than a few people object to the idea of ‘presuming’ anything when it comes to such a 
sensitive matter.’”). 
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tion system in the United States.  Part III examines the history of opt-
out organ donation laws in the United States, the recent state pro-
posals, and presumed consent systems around the world.  Part IV dis-
cusses some of the policy implications of presumed consent for the 
United States.  Finally, the constitutional implications of presumed 
consent are examined in Part V.   
II. THE CURRENT OPT-IN SYSTEM  
A. Living Donation 
Living organ donation occurs when an organ is procured from a 
living donor and transplanted into an organ recipient.24  This differs 
from cadaveric organ donation where the organ donor has been de-
clared legally dead.25  There are five types of living donor transplants 
performed in the United States: kidney (entire organ), liver (seg-
ment), lung (lobe), intestine (portion), and pancreas (portion).26  Alt-
hough living organ donation is a vital part of the organ procurement 
system in the United States, it will not be discussed further in this 
Comment since presumed consent laws pertain only to cadaveric or-
gan donation. 
B. Cadaveric Donation 
1. History 
The current cadaveric organ procurement system in the United 
States first began to take shape with the passage of the 1968 Uniform 
Anatomical Gift Act (1968 UAGA).27  Besides setting forth the first 
comprehensive legislation dealing with organ transplantation, the 
primary goal of the 1968 UAGA was to harmonize the various state 
organ donation laws that had already come into effect.28  The 1968 
UAGA addressed such issues as who may donate an organ and how a 
person’s desire to donate should be documented.29  In 1977, the first 
computerized donor-donee matching system, the United Network for 
Organ Sharing (UNOS), was established by the South-Eastern Organ 
                                                                                                                           
 24 See Living Donation, Information You Need to Know, UNOS, 
http://www.unos.org/docs/ 
Living_Donation.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2011). 
 25 See Common Myths, Fact Sheets, Patient Education, Donation & Transplantation, 
UNOS, http://www.unos.org/donation/index.php?topic=fact_sheet_7 (last visited Mar. 7, 2011). 
 26 See Living Donation, Information You Need to Know, supra note 24. 
 27 See Watkins, supra note 8, at 10.  
 28 See Fitzgibbons, supra note 4, at 75-76. 
 29 See id. at 75-78. 
2011] No Means No, But Silence Means Yes? 153 
Procurement Foundation.30  Although charged with many duties, the 
primary task of UNOS was, and continues to be, the matching of do-
nors and candidates.31  Two subsequent pieces of legislation addressed 
two critical issues that the 1968 UAGA neglected to address: (1) the 
sale of human organs and (2) the determination of death for the pur-
poses of cadaveric organ donation.32  In 1980, the National Organ 
Transplant Act (NOTA) provided that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any 
person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any hu-
man organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplanta-
tion if the transfer affects interstate commerce.”33  The NOTA also 
called for the establishment of an Organ Procurement and Transplan-
tation Network (OPTN).34  Then, in 1984, the Uniform Determination 
of Death Act (UDDA) codified the preexisting common law defini-
tion of death as “‘an individual who has sustained either (1) irreversi-
ble cessation of all functions of circulatory and respiratory function or 
(2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including 
the brain stem . . . .’”35 
In 1987, the progression of science and technology in the field of 
organ transplantation, as well as an increased need for cadaveric or-
gan donation, necessitated a revised version of the UAGA.36  The 
1987 UAGA featured some much needed improvements, such as the 
simplification of the process by which one could designate himself or 
herself a cadaveric donor.37  This simplification enabled states to begin 
utilizing the present method of recording a person’s desired donor 
status on identification cards, such as driver’s licenses.38  Further, the 
1987 UAGA required hospitals to designate specific personnel to 
conduct “routine inquiries” as to patients’ donor wishes and “required 
requests” of next of kin for an anatomical gift from a decedent.39  In 
addition, the 1987 UAGA incorporated NOTA’s prohibition on the 
sale of human organs.40  Most significant, however, is the fact that the 
                                                                                                                           
 30 See Watkins, supra note 8, at 11. 
 31 See id.; About Us, supra note 17. 
 32 See Fitzgibbons, supra note 4, at 79. 
 33 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2010). 
 34 See 42 U.S.C. § 274.  UNOS has run the OPTN since its inception in 1986.  See History, 
Donation & Transplantation, UNOS, http://www.unos.org/donation/index.php?topic=history 
(last visited Mar. 6, 2011).   
 35 The New York Academy of Medicine, Statement and Resolution on the Definition of 
Death (Nov. 1984), http:// www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1911797/pdf/bullnyacadmed 
00075-0103.pdf (quoting the Uniform Determination of Death Act). 
 36 See Fitzgibbons, supra note 4, at 81. 
 37 See id. at 82. 
 38 See id.  
 39 See id. 
 40 See id. at 82-83. 
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1987 UAGA contained a limited presumed consent provision.41  Un-
der the 1987 UAGA, a medical examiner or coroner could authorize 
the removal of any needed donor organ or tissue from a decedent in 
the absence of any knowledge that a decedent or a decedent’s next of 
kin objected to such removal.42  Although the 1987 UAGA provision 
presented the first national experiment with limited scope presumed 
consent laws, it is noteworthy that many states, as early as the 1960s, 
had enacted limited scope presumed consent laws in an effort to in-
crease cadaveric organ donation.43  These early statutes were most 
often restricted to cornea or pituitary gland removal, and nearly all 
were limited in their application to cadavers in the custody of medical 
examiners or coroners.44  These precursor state presumed consent 
laws will be discussed in more detail infra at Section III.A.   Howev-
er, by 2006, when the UAGA was revised, yet again, a number of law-
suits involving the once popular state presumed consent laws resulted 
in the elimination of the presumed consent provisions from the 2006 
UAGA.45  Ultimately, most states followed suit and eliminated their 
presumed consent laws by either adopting the 2006 UAGA or repeal-
ing their individual presumed consent statutes.46 
2. How the Current Opt-In System Works 
a.  Becoming a Donor – Providing Consent 
The current opt-in system in the United States requires potential 
donors or their next of kin to opt-in or provide explicit consent to or-
gan donation.47  Thus, absent such explicit consent, it is presumed that 
a decedent did not wish to be an organ donor, or opted-out.  Potential 
donors can document their explicit consent by (1) registering with 
their state donor registry, (2) designating their donor status on a driv-
er’s license, (3) signing and carrying a donor card, and (4) informing 
their family about their decision to be an organ donor.48  Although 
often overlooked, family awareness is an important aspect of ensuring 
                                                                                                                           
 41 See id. at 82. 
 42 See id.; Orentlicher, supra note 14, at 300. 
 43 See Orentlicher, supra note 14, at 299, 302. 
 44 See id. at 302-03. 
 45 See id. at 300, 305-08. 
 46 See id. at 300-01. 
 47 See Watkins, supra note 8, at 14; Fitzgibbons, supra note 4, at 74; Orentlicher, supra 
note 14, at 298-99; Jacob M. Appel, Scavenging for Organs: Why the Donor Famine Justifies a 
Radical Harvest, HUFFINGTON POST, (Mar. 15, 2010, 02:09 PM), 
http:/www.huffingtonpost.com/Jacob-m-appel/scavenging-for-organs-why_b_499479.html. 
 48 See Becoming a Donor, ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://www.organdonor.gov/become.asp 
(last visited Mar. 6, 2011). 
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that one’s wishes to become an organ donor are carried out.49  Con-
cerns about liability often prevent doctors from removing organs 
without the consent of next of kin despite a decedent’s properly doc-
umented organ donor status.50 
b.  Becoming a Transplant Candidate – Registering as a Candidate 
To be placed on the national waiting list for an organ transplant, 
a person must first obtain a referral from a physician and be evaluated 
by a hospital with a transplant center [hereinafter transplant hospi-
tal].51  After evaluation, the hospital’s transplant team will determine 
when and at what status code a person will be added to the national 
waiting list.52  The status code indicates how urgent a person’s need is 
for a particular organ transplant.53  
c.  Matching Donors and Candidates 
There are several players involved in facilitating the matching 
process that unites available donor organs with compatible transplant 
candidates.  Besides, of course, the donors and transplant candidates 
themselves, organ procurement organizations (OPOs), transplant cen-
ters, and UNOS play pivotal roles.54  Using DonorNet, a centralized 
Internet-based database created by UNOS, Organ Procurement Co-
ordinators at OPOs communicate information regarding newly ac-
quired donor organs to transplant hospitals with compatible trans-
plant candidates.55  Many different considerations are factored into 
the compatibility determination, such as the age of the candidate, the 
blood and tissue type of the candidate (otherwise known as histocom-
patibility), the urgency of the candidate’s need, the amount of time 
the candidate has spent on the national waiting list, the geographic 
distance between the donor organ and the candidate,56 the size of the 
                                                                                                                           
 49 See id.; Organ Donor FAQs, How to Be a Donor, If I Register as a Donor Will My 
Wishes Be Carried Out?, ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://www.organdonor.gov/faqs.html (last visit-
ed Mar. 21, 2012). 
 50 See Fitzgibbons, supra note 4, at 84. 
 51 See Organ Donation: The Process, About Donation & Transplantation, ORGAN 
DONOR.GOV, http://www.organdonor.gov/about/transplantationprocess.html#process2 (last 
visited Aug. 3, 2012). 
 52 See id. 
 53 See id. 
 54 See Organ Donation: The Process, ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://www.organdonor.gov/ 
about/organdonationprocess. html#process1 (last visited Aug. 15, 2012). 
 55 See Organ Allocation, Donation & Transplantation, UNOS, http://www.unos.org/ 
donation/index.php?topic=orga n_allocation (last visited Mar. 6, 2011). 
 56 The length of time a donor organ remains viable for transplantation varies according the 
specific type of organ being transplanted.  Heart: 4-6 hours, Liver: 12-24 hours, Kidney: 48-72 
hours, Heart-Lung: 4-6 hours, Lung: 4-6 hours.  See id. 
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donor organ in relation to the size of the candidate,57 and the type of 
donor organ needed.58 
d.  A Hybrid System – Mandated Choice 
The main point of difference for the varying types of organ pro-
curement systems lies at the point of consent.59  However, the opt-in 
and opt-out systems do share at least one common aspect – they both 
entail the raising of a presumption based on a decedent’s failure to 
affirmatively act.  Accordingly, in an opt-in system, a decedent is pre-
sumed to have not consented to organ donation if s/he never opted-in.  
Conversely, in an opt-out system, a decedent is presumed to have con-
sented to organ donation if s/he never opted-out.  However, there is 
an organ procurement system that involves the raising of no presump-
tions whatsoever.  This system is referred to as “mandated choice” 
and is seen as a middle-ground in the debate over opt-in and opt-out 
systems.60  Under a mandated choice system, individuals must explicit-
ly choose to either opt-in or opt-out of organ donation.61  There is also 
a “soft” version of the mandated choice system that allows individuals 
to select a third option, which instructs doctors to ask the individual’s 
next of kin for consent.62  Neither consent nor lack of consent is pre-
sumed in mandated choice, and thus, it is more palatable to those in-
dividuals who express discomfort with the presumption of consent (or 
lack thereof).63  California recently passed legislation establishing a 
mandated choice system after initial efforts to pass legislation estab-
                                                                                                                           
 57 A donor organ from a large adult would be too big for a small child.  See Organ Dona-
tion: The Process, supra note 54. 
 58 See Organ Matching Process, Common Elements, ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://www. 
organdonor.gov/about/organmatching.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2012). 
 59 See Watkins, supra note 8, at 14-20. 
 60 See Cover, supra note 10 (“‘Another [problem] is that [presumed consent] is a hard sell 
politically. . . . [P]eople object to the idea of ‘presuming’ anything when it comes to such a sensi-
tive matter.  For these reasons, . . . the best choice architecture for organ donations is mandated 
choice.’”).  
 61 See Carol J. Roberts, Presumed Consent for Organ Procurement—Does It Have a 
Future in the U.S.? (Ethical-Legal Perspectives), 35 J. NEUROSCIENCE NURSING 107, 108-09 
(Apr. 2003); Cover, supra note 10. 
 62 See Roberts, supra note 61; Appel, supra note 47. 
 63 See Cover, supra note 10 (“‘Another [problem] is that [presumed consent] is a hard sell 
politically. . . . [P]eople object to the idea of ‘presuming’ anything when it comes to such a sensi-
tive matter.  For these reasons, . . . the best choice architecture for organ donations is mandated 
choice.’”). 
2011] No Means No, But Silence Means Yes? 157 
lishing an opt-out system failed.64  Texas, Colorado, and Illinois have 
also passed mandated choice laws.65 
III. THE OPT-OUT SYSTEM 
A. The History of Presumed Consent Laws in the United States 
As discussed above in Section II, presumed consent laws are not 
entirely new to the United States.66  Starting as early as the 1960’s, 
various states implemented presumed consent laws in an effort to in-
crease organ donation.67  All of these statutes, with the exception of 
one,68 were limited in application to cadavers in the custody of medical 
examiners or coroners.69  The rationale behind allowing for presumed 
consent in these contexts was that such decedents would already be 
subjected to a major intrusion by way of an autopsy.70  In addition, the 
majority of the early presumed consent laws only allowed for the re-
moval of corneas and pituitary glands.71  The pro-presumed consent 
stance of the 1987 UAGA further reinforced the trend in state pre-
sumed consent laws such that, at their peak, presumed consent laws 
were in effect in more than two-thirds of the fifty states.72  It is im-
portant to note, however, that these early presumed consent laws 
were of the “soft” variety, and as such, allowed for a family member 
to object to the donation and thus override the presumption of con-
sent.73   
The success of the early presumed consent laws in the United 
States seemed to largely depend on their acceptance by medical pro-
fessionals.74  In those states where presumed consent laws were em-
braced by medical professionals, they enjoyed much success and 
                                                                                                                           
 64 See Judd Kessler, Organ Donation Legislation in California, MARKET DESIGN, (Oct. 8, 
2010, 05:19 AM), http://marketdesigner.blogspot.com/2010/10/organ-donation-legislation-
in.html. 
 65 See Thaler on Mandated Choice, MARKET DESIGN, (Sep. 27, 2009, 05:59 AM), 
http://marketdesigner.blogspot.co m/2009/09/thaler-on-mandated-choice.html; see also Organ 
Transplants, ENOTES, http://www.enotes.com/organ-transplants-article (last visited Mar. 6, 
2011). 
 66 See Orentlicher, supra note 14, at 302. 
 67 See id.  
 68 A California presumed consent statute was also applicable to hospital patients.  See 
Orentlicher, supra note 14, at 302. 
 69 See id.  
 70 See id. at 299-300. 
 71 See id. at 302-03. 
 72 See id. at 300. 
 73 See id. at 300, 310. 
 74 See id. at 303-04. 
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achieved the desired results of increasing cadaveric organ donation.75  
However, presumed consent laws were less successful in other states 
where medical professionals, wary of the controversial nature of the 
laws or fearful of incurring liability, refused to harvest organs without 
express consent from either a decedent or next of kin.76 
The decline of presumed consent laws in the United States began 
in the early 1990’s with a few high-profile legal challenges, discussed 
in more detail in Section V.77  The decline continued over the course 
of the next fifteen years with official recognition of presumed con-
sent’s demise coming in 2006 with a revised UAGA noticeably lacking 
the presumed consent provisions of the 1987 UAGA.78  Forty-five 
states, in addition to the District of Columbia and the United States 
Virgin Islands, have since enacted the 2006 UAGA.79  The majority of 
those states have followed the 2006 UAGA’s rejection of presumed 
consent and have repealed their presumed consent laws.80  A few 
states, however, have retained presumed consent for an unclaimed 
decedent’s corneas.81  However, as the next section discusses, the 
worsening organ shortage crisis has fueled a resurgence of interest on 
the part of the states in alternative organ procurement systems – and 
the opt-out system seems to have taken center stage in the debate.   
B. Recent State Proposals for Opt-Out Organ Donation Laws. 
In the past year alone, four states, California, New York, Illinois, 
and Colorado, have made serious attempts to pass comprehensive 
presumed consent legislation in an effort to implement state-wide opt-
out organ donation systems.82  In California, constitutional concerns 
forced Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger to abandon his push for a 
state-wide opt-out system and instead settle for a mandated choice 
system.83  If passed, the recently proposed presumed consent laws in 
                                                                                                                           
 75 See id. at 303. 
 76 See id. at 303-04. 
 77 See id. at 305-08. 
 78 See id. at 307-08. 
 79 Pennsylvania is currently considering its enactment.  See Anatomical Gift Act (2006), 
Enactment Status Map, UNIF.  LAW COMM’N, http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Anatomical 
Gift Act (2006) (last visited Aug. 3, 2012). 
 80 See Orentlicher, supra note 14, at 308. 
 81 See id.  
 82 See Appel, supra note 47. 
 83 See Our View on End-of-Life Choices: States Overlook Easy Way to Raise Organ 
Donation Rates, USA TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2010-05-19-
editorial19_ST_N.htm (last updated May 18, 2010, 08:55 PM). 
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New York, Illinois, and Colorado would implement the first opt-out 
organ procurement systems in the nation.84 
1. California 
The impetus behind Governor Schwarzenegger’s brief foray into 
presumed consent laws came from an unlikely source – Steve Jobs, 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Apple, Inc.85  Mr. Jobs, a 
liver transplant recipient himself, suggested the move to an opt-out 
system after returning to California from a trip to Europe where he 
saw the potential benefits of an opt-out system first-hand.86  With Cali-
fornia having one of the lowest rates of organ donation in the coun-
try,87 Governor Schwarzenegger thought an opt-out system might be 
the answer for California.88  However, the ensuing public outcry soon 
prompted Governor Schwarzenegger to abandon the opt-out proposal 
citing constitutional concerns.89  In the end, the bill that Governor 
Schwarzenegger signed into effect on October 5, 2010 was a compro-
mise.90  Instead of an opt-out system, senate bill (SB) 1395 established 
a mandated choice system in California.91  All driver’s license appli-
cants in California will now be asked to choose whether they want to 
be an organ donor (and thus be added to the state’s organ and tissue 
donor registry).92  Previously, applicants had to volunteer this infor-
mation in order to have their organ donor status reflected on a driv-
er’s license.93  Further, the bill established the first ever live donor reg-
istry for kidney transplants in the nation.94  SB 1395 provides in perti-
nent part: 
[A]n application for an original or renewal driver’s license or 
identification card shall contain a space for the applicant to en-
roll in the Donate Life California Organ and Tissue Donor Reg-
istry.  The application shall include check boxes for an applicant 
to mark either (A) Yes, add my name to the donor registry or 
(B) I do not wish to register at this time.  The department shall 
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inquire verbally of an applicant applying in person for an original 
or renewal driver’s license or identification card at a department 
office as to whether the applicant wishes to enroll in the Donate 
Life California Organ and Tissue Donor Registry.95 
2. New York 
On February 4, 2010, New York State Assemblyman Richard 
Brodsky introduced bill number A09865 which “provides that indi-
viduals must opt[-]out of organ donation.”96  With regard to driver’s 
license applicants, A09865 proposes in pertinent part: 
[T]he commissioner also shall . . . provide space on the applica-
tion so that  the applicant  may . . . OPT-OUT  OF the New York 
state organ and tissue donor registry . . . .  IF THE APPLICANT 
DOES NOT DECLINE TO BE REGISTERED IN THE NEW 
YORK STATE ORGAN AND TISSUE DONOR REGISTRY 
THEY WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY ENROLLED.97 
The self-professed purpose of the bill is to “significantly in-
creas[e] [New York’s organ donation rate] while taking into consider-
ation all of the individual rights of persons to decline enrollment into 
the program.”  For justification, the bill points to the fact that New 
York has the lowest organ donation rate in the country.98   
3. Illinois 
In February of 2010, Illinois Senator Dale Risinger introduced 
bill 3613, the Presumed Donor bill.99  If passed, the bill will replace 
Illinois’s current opt-in organ procurement system with one that is 
opt-out.100  Like the California and New York presumed consent pro-
posals, the bill has already been met with opposition.101  The proposed 
bill provides in pertinent part: 
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[E]ach resident of Illinois who is of sound mind and who has at-
tained the age of 18 years is presumed, by operation of law, to 
have given all of his or her body for any purpose stated in section 
5-10 [medical or dental education, research, advancement of 
medical or dental science, therapy, or transplantation].  The gift 
takes effect upon the individual’s death without the need to ob-
tain the consent of any survivor. . . .an individual may . . . opt[-
]out . . . by filing with the Secretary of State[]. . .an organ donor 
opt[-] out document.  An individual who has filed [an organ do-
nor opt-out] document shall be included in an Organ Donor Opt 
Out Registry maintained by the Secretary of State.102 
4. Colorado 
In mid-January 2011, State Representative Dan Pabon intro-
duced a presumed consent organ donation bill, SB 11-042, in the Col-
orado General Assembly.103  Perhaps Representative Pabon is hoping 
that his donor-friendly state104 will be more receptive to the idea of 
presumed consent than other states where similar proposals have 
failed to pass.105  If passed, SB 11-042, entitled “A Bill Concerning 
Presumed Consent for Organ and Tissue Donation,” would  
change[] [Colorado’s] organ donation program so that a person is 
presumed to have consented to organ and tissue donation at the 
time the person applies for or renews a driver’s license or [state] 
identification card unless the person initials a statement that 
states that the person does not want to be considered as a possi-
ble organ and tissue donor.106   
The proposed text of the opt-out statement appears in the bill as 
follows: 
You are automatically deemed to have consented to being an or-
gan and tissue donor and this designation will appear on your 
driver’s license or identification card.  If you do not want to be 
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considered an organ and tissue donor, you must elect to not be 
included on the organ donor registry by inserting your initials on 
the line below. 
______ At this time, I do not wish to be included on the organ 
donor registry.107 
The bill further states that 
[u]nless an applicant responds that he or she does not want to be 
considered a possible organ and tissue donor, the applicant will 
be deemed to have consented to organ and tissue donation.  The 
consent is sufficient to satisfy all requirements necessary to evi-
dence the applicant’s consent to anatomical donation of the ap-
plicant’s organs and tissue.108 
Colorado State Senator Lucia Guzman was initially supporting 
the bill, but soon after its proposal, dropped her support.109  Thus, the 
future of the bill is now uncertain.110  Nevertheless, SB 11-042 has 
managed to create a lot of controversy in a relatively short amount of 
time.111 
C. Opt-Out Systems Around the World 
There are several countries around the world that utilize opt-out 
organ procurement systems, some more successfully than others.112  
Spain, Austria, France, Belgium, Italy, Norway, and Sweden are 
among some of the countries that have adopted presumed consent 
organ donation laws.113  Austria utilizes a “hard” opt-out system, in 
which the consent of next of kin is not required prior to removing or-
gans from a decedent who did not previously opt-out.114  Spain utilizes 
a “soft” opt-out system, in which next of kin are given the opportunity 
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to object to organ donation, even if the decedent did not previously 
opt-out.115  In some countries, such as France, “hard” systems are ef-
fectively rendered “soft” by physicians that are hesitant to remove a 
decedent’s organs without the consent of next of kin.116  In a 2008 in-
ternational comparison of organ donation rates, all of these countries 
were ranked in the top twenty, with Spain leading the way with a rate 
of 34.2 organ donors per million.117  Indeed, many countries that have 
implemented presumed consent donation systems have seen drastic 
increases in their organ donation rates.118   
However, whether the presumed consent laws of these countries 
are single-handedly responsible for their higher procurement rates is a 
subject of much debate.119  For instance, some commentators argue 
that although Spain’s presumed consent laws have been in effect for 
several decades, they are, for the most part, inactive.120  They point to 
Spain’s lack of spending on public awareness of its presumed consent 
legislation, and the fact that Spain does not have an opt-out registry 
for recording the objections of those who do not wish to become or-
gan donors.121  Instead, these commentators posit other theories for 
Spain’s success.122  Some theorize that Spain’s high organ donation 
rate is partly attributable to the larger numbers of healthy individuals 
killed there in automobile accidents.123  Others, including Dr. Rafael 
Matesanz, the director of Organizacion Nacional de Trasplantes, the 
organization that manages Spain’s organ donation system, attribute 
Spain’s success in increasing organ donation rates to its investment in 
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the infrastructure of its organ procurement system.124  Thus, it may be 
that presumed consent laws do not provide the easy fix that many 
hope they will. 
IV. THE POLICY & ETHICS OF PRESUMED CONSENT ORGAN 
DONATION 
Ask any American what core moral and ethical values underlie 
American society, and you are sure to hear back words such as indi-
vidualism, beneficence, altruism, and autonomy.125  After all, these 
values form the bedrock of the “most American” of American institu-
tions: democracy and capitalism.  Americans champion these values 
and look to their government and courts to defend and reinforce 
them.  It is no wonder then that the most emphatic objections against 
the adoption of presumed consent systems in the United States stem 
from these most sacred of principles.126 
A. Of Liberty, Autonomy, and Privacy 
As Americans, perhaps there is no area where we value our liber-
ty, autonomy, and privacy more than in the realm of “freedom of 
choice.”127  We take pride in the fact that our country affords us more 
freedom of choice than perhaps any other country in the world.  From 
what type of cereal to grab off the shelf in the dizzying grocery store 
cereal aisle, to which politician to vote for when we step inside the 
voting booth, to whether to remain silent or confess – when it comes 
to personal decision-making, there is nothing more American than 
liberty and autonomy; regardless of whether we like the choices we 
are presented with at any given time, we take comfort in knowing that 
we at least have a choice, while others do not.   
In fact, the paramount importance that Americans put on privacy 
and autonomy when exercising their freedom of choice is no better 
evidenced than by the numerous United States Supreme Court opin-
ions in recent decades that have constitutionalized privacy within the 
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context of American personal decision-making.128  Accordingly, 
Americans have come to expect that, without their affirmative con-
sent, this sphere of privacy cannot be invaded by the government (ex-
cept for certain compelling reasons).  Although controversial at times, 
the current opt-in organ donation system in the United States is still 
generally acceptable precisely because it is consistent with these prin-
ciples.   No one in this country is an organ donor unless s/he affirma-
tively chooses to be one;129 the decision to be an organ donor is an au-
tonomous one – the government and/or medical professionals do not 
enter the decision-making process until after the decision has been 
made.  
On the other hand, to most Americans, an opt-out or presumed 
consent system of organ donation flies directly in the face of these 
values.  Under a presumed consent system, government intrusion into 
the personal decision of organ donation is the default, rather than a 
consented-to transgression.130  Such unbridled government intrusion 
into a personal decision concerning death and the sanctity of one’s 
own body would undoubtedly be met with much opposition – as al-
ready demonstrated by the California and New York attempts to es-
tablish state-wide presumed consent organ donation systems.   
A mandated choice system, discussed in Section II.B.2.d., may in 
fact provide the best compromise between addressing America’s organ 
crisis and preserving individuals’ autonomy in making the decision 
whether to become an organ donor.131  Moreover, the increased public 
awareness that would result from a mandated choice system may help 
to spur further evolution in America’s organ donation policy.132 
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1. Requiring an Affirmative Act and Altruism 
It goes without saying that part of freedom of choice is choosing 
not to act.  In fact, in the interest of individual liberty and autonomy, 
both tort and criminal common law caution against legally obligating 
individuals to act for the benefit of others.133  Instead, laws in our 
country traditionally require only that individuals act in ways that do 
not result in harm to others.134  Nevertheless, many proponents of pre-
sumed consent laws contend that their imposition on personal auton-
omy is justified by virtue of the moral good of saving lives.135  Accord-
ing to this argument, a presumed consent system presumes that most 
people “wish to do the morally right thing.”136  Thus, from an ethical 
perspective, presumed consent laws impose what is called passive al-
truism; they obligate people to act for the benefit of others (unless 
they register an affirmative objection).137  However, as noted above, 
legislating altruism is not a part of the American legal tradition.  In-
stead, American society has come to endorse a policy of active altru-
ism, whereby an individual affirmatively chooses whether to act for 
the benefit of others.138  Such is the case with the current opt-in organ 
donation system in the United States, which relies on the active altru-
ism of organ donors and their families for its survival.  
Along the same lines, perception plays a big part in Americans’ 
acceptance of laws and policies that challenge these notions.139  For 
many Americans, the individual rights surrounding the most funda-
mental aspects of their personal lives and bodies are only theirs to 
forfeit or “give away.”  Accordingly, laws and policies that are con-
sistent with the notion of active altruism, such as explicit consent or-
gan donation laws, are most palatable to the American public.  As 
evidenced by the term “donor,” the act of organ procurement under 
explicit consent organ donation laws is perceived as an act of “giving”, 
with the individual affirmatively choosing to waive certain individual 
rights for the benefit of another.140  Conversely, under presumed con-
sent organ donation laws, the act of organ procurement is more likely 
to be perceived as an act of “taking” – with the government intruding 
upon the rights of the individual without consent.141  This perception 
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may very well be the fatal flaw that makes it very difficult, if not im-
possible, for presumed consent laws to gain wide acceptance by the 
American public. 
2. The Legal Fiction of Presumed Consent 
In law, a presumption is best described as “[a] conclusion made 
as to the existence or nonexistence of a fact that [is] drawn from other 
evidence that is admitted and proven to be true.”142  There are two 
types of legal presumptions: rebuttable and irrebuttable.143  Within the 
context of evidence law, however, the vast majority of presumptions 
are rebuttable, meaning the presumed fact can be negated by the of-
fering of sufficient evidence.144  It is on this point that the concept of 
presumed consent reveals itself as a legal fiction.   
Under the usual operating procedures of a true legal presump-
tion, the donor should have the opportunity to rebut or negate the 
presumption of consent.145  Under a presumed consent system, howev-
er, the presumption of consent does not arise until a person is de-
ceased.  Put in terms of the above definition, death and the failure to 
opt-out are the sole evidentiary facts that must be proven to lead to 
the conclusion of the existence of consent.  So, when does the pre-
sumed donor have the opportunity to rebut or negate the presump-
tion of consent?  The answer here is obviously never, since the donor 
is deceased and can no longer raise any objections.146   
One could argue that the presumed donor has at least one, and 
possibly two, chances to rebut or negate the presumption: prior to 
death by opting-out and after death by the objection of next of kin.  
The first argument fails, however, because as noted above, the pre-
sumption does not arise until the person is deceased.  Opting-out be-
fore death is an affirmative expression by the individual that s/he does 
not wish to be an organ donor.  As such, opting-out merely prevents 
the presumption from arising in the first place; it does not operate to 
rebut or negate it.  The second argument, although stronger, is also 
problematic.  First, the objection of next of kin only comes into play in 
a “soft” presumed consent system.147  As discussed in Section III.C., in 
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a “hard” presumed consent system, the consent of next of kin is nei-
ther sought nor considered.148  Second, assuming a “soft” system, in 
order to register an objection on behalf of the deceased, the next of 
kin would have to (1) be aware of the state presumed consent statutes 
and (2) be able to register the objection within a relatively short 
amount of time after the death of the decedent.  Unfortunately, the 
chance of both of these conditions being satisfied concurrently is slim 
at best.  When states have presumed consent laws, the evidence shows 
that people are generally unaware that the statutes exist.149  Further, 
because organs and tissues must be harvested soon after death to en-
sure their viability, the window of opportunity for registering an ob-
jection is brief.150  Moreover, even if these conditions are satisfied, un-
less the decedent’s organ donor status has been explicitly provided for 
in a will or similar document, the possibility remains that the next of 
kin will provide consent contrary to the wishes of the decedent.  
So, what is being presumed when one presumes consent to organ 
donation?151  In theory, one is making a presumption of donor willing-
ness.152  In reality, however, presumed consent laws place the state’s 
interest in saving lives above the individual’s interest in autonomy,153 
and thus, the presumption being made is that “of state rights to post-
mortem body organs.”154  Accordingly, some have proposed that the 
phrase “presumed consent” is a misnomer that should be replaced by 
the phrase “specified refusal” in order to place emphasis on the action 
(i.e., opting-out) that is required of the individual in presumed con-
sent systems.155 
3. Organ Donation as a Private Choice 
As discussed in section V. infra, the gradual constitutionalization 
of individual privacy by the United States Supreme Court means that 
each of us, as citizens, has come to expect that we will be free of gov-
ernment interference when it comes to making certain personal deci-
sions concerning life and death.  Of course, the right of privacy and 
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personal liberty grounded by the Court in the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment is not absolute.156  Like all fundamental 
rights recognized by the Court, the government can curtail the right of 
privacy in furtherance of a compelling interest.157  
Organ donation is most certainly one area of personal decision-
making in which Americans do not expect to run into government 
interference.  And unlike other modern, controversial privacy issues, 
such as abortion and assisted suicide, most people seem to agree that 
the government should not have a say in whether a person chooses to 
donate his/her organs.  Of course, this sense of universal agreement 
could merely be a reflection of the fact that proposals calling for in-
creased government involvement in cadaveric organ donation are rel-
atively recent and have escaped wide-spread public scrutiny, at least 
on a national scale.158  However, a consideration of the values at play 
in each of these areas reveals that there is a more likely explanation 
for the congruence than lack of public awareness.  In both the abor-
tion and assisted suicide contexts, many Americans accept, and even 
condone, government intrusion into such decisions to prevent inten-
tional harm to a human life.159  Besides being an underlying theme of 
most major religions, “do no harm” is a principle underlying tort and 
criminal common law.  Moreover, in the Court’s view, it is the preven-
tion of intentional harm to a human life what furnishes the compelling 
interest necessary to justify government intrusion into these areas.160     
In contrast, few Americans would argue that the decision not to 
donate one’s organs is equivalent to an intentional act of harm to-
wards another individual.  Rather, most would view such a decision as 
an act of self-preservation, with any incidental third-party harm being 
indirect at best.161  Further, while many would argue that saving the 
lives of those individuals waiting for organ transplants is a compelling 
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government interest, the question remains whether it is compelling 
enough to justify government intrusion into such a personal and pri-
vate decision.  Absent the moral underpinnings present within the 
contexts of abortion and assisted suicide, the answer here would ap-
pear to be “no.”  Moreover, one would assume that, to require indi-
viduals to affirmatively act for the benefit of others, the nature and 
degree of the compelling interest at play would have to rise above and 
beyond those compelling interests which justify government intrusion 
into the abortion and assisted suicide contexts.  Such is not the case 
here, and thus presumed consent laws will not likely pass the muster 
of today’s privacy jurisprudence. 
B. Where is the Social Justice? 
Socioeconomics and Disparate Impact 
Presumed consent organ donation laws are also problematic from 
a social justice perspective.162  Past experiences with presumed consent 
laws have shown that racial, cultural, and socioeconomic factors inevi-
tably lead to their disparate impact on marginalized groups, such as 
the poor, uneducated, and minorities.163  For example, in those states 
that had presumed consent laws prior to their widespread eradication 
with the promulgation of the 2006 UAGA, implementation was 
placed primarily in the hands of coroners and medical examiners.164  
As a result, a disproportionate number of presumed consent organ 
and tissue donations under these laws came from donors who had met 
violent deaths165 or could not be identified – groups traditionally com-
prised of minorities and the poor.166  This disparity seems all the more 
unfair when one considers that members of such groups are also the 
least likely to be recipients of a donor organ.167 
Even if one imagines a better future for presumed consent laws – 
one in which such disparities are eliminated by a more standardized 
and widespread implementation scheme – the fact remains that those 
people who are uneducated and/or ignorant about the law will be dis-
                                                                                                                           
 162 See Goodwin, supra note 149. 
 163 See id. at ¶ 44. 
 164 See id. at ¶ 22. 
 165 See id. (Violent deaths, such as “homicides, trauma, and poisonings, . . . [occur] dispro-
portionately in urban and poor communities”); Id. at ¶ 44 (As a result, presumed consent laws, 
as applied, disproportionately affect minorities, such as blacks and latinos, who are “more likely 
to die by violent deaths than whites . . . .”); Id. at ¶ 45.  (“In a Los Angeles study . . . over eighty 
percent of those autopsied (and who became involuntary tissue donors)[] were black and latino.  
Only sixteen percent were white.”). 
 166 See id. at ¶¶ 43-46. 
 167 See id. at ¶ 43.  
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advantaged in a system that requires prospective awareness and com-
prehension of the law in order to effectively opt-out.  Thus, although 
presumed consent laws are often justified as good for the whole,168 
they are anything but equitable, and are more likely to end up benefit-
ing some to the detriment of others.169 
C. Medical Ethics Concerns 
Of the numerous bioethical concerns raised by presumed consent 
laws, perhaps the two most significant, from the perspective of the 
modern medical establishment, are the lack of explicit informed con-
sent170 and the risks posed by procuring organs and tissues from do-
nors with unknown social histories.171  
The modern-day requirement of explicit informed consent as a 
condition precedent to medical treatment and research is an im-
portant one.172  Nothing better illustrates this point than its historical 
roots.  In particular, two atrocities of the twentieth century are re-
sponsible for the mandate of explicit informed consent – the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study173 and the Holocaust.174  Both events revealed modern 
                                                                                                                           
 168 See id. at ¶ 49.  
 169 See id. ¶¶ 51-52. 
 170 See Pierscionek, supra note 146, at 2 (“[C]onsent to medical treatment and/or study on 
any part of the body must always be sought.”). 
 171 See Goodwin, supra note 149, at ¶¶ 39-42. 
 172 See OFFICE OF HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, 
REGULATIONS AND ETHICAL GUIDELINES, PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS (June 23, 2005), 
http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/45cfr46.html (“Except as provided elsewhere in this policy, no 
investigator may involve a human being as a subject in research covered by this policy unless the 
investigator has obtained the legally effective informed consent of the subject or the subject's 
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 173 The Tuskegee Syphilis Study was a 40-year study, spanning 1932-1972, that involved six 
hundred black men from Macon County, Alabama, a predominantly poor, rural area.  See U.S. 
Public Health Service Syphilis Study at Tuskegee, CDC.GOV, http://www.cdc.gov/tuskegee/ 
timeline.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2012); Inside the National Archives, Southeast Region: 6. The 
Tuskegee Study, NATIONALARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/southeast/exhibit/6.php.  The 
study was conducted to follow the natural progression of syphilis in blacks, with the hopes of 
justifying black treatment programs.  See id.  Three hundred and ninety nine of the men had 
syphilis, the other two hundred and one did not.  See id.  Although the men agreed to be in the 
study, none of them provided “informed” consent as the term is used today – the men were not 
informed of the real purpose for the study and in fact, none of the three hundred and ninety nine 
men who had syphilis were informed of this fact or were treated for it, even after the emergence, 
in 1947, of penicillin as the standard treatment for the disease.  See id.  For taking part in the 
study, the men received “free medical exams, free meals, and burial insurance.”  Id.  Only in 
1972, after the publication of an associated press story about the study, did public outcry lead to 
the termination of the study.  See id.  By that time, numerous study participants had died from 
syphilis and related complications.  See Remembering Tuskegee, NPR.ORG (July 25, 2002), 
http://www.npr.org/programs/morning/features/2002/jul/ tuskegee/.  Moreover, many had passed 
the disease on to their wives and children.  See id. 
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medicine’s potential for abuse, especially with respect to those who 
are marginalized in society.175  The subsequent outcries for better pro-
tections of human subjects of treatment and/or research eventually led 
to the regulations mandating the use and documentation of explicit 
informed consent in such activities today.176  
Some in the medical community also express concern about the 
“quality” of tissues and organs procured by way of presumed con-
sent.177  They point to the lax health requirements for presumed con-
sent donors and the fact that presumed consent statutes typically “do 
not mandate that [the] social histories [of donors] be obtained.”178  
These shortfalls, combined with the “lifestyles of some [likely] pre-
sumed consent donors,”179 can lead to the transmission of communica-
ble diseases from donor to recipient.180  Obviously, such an outcome 
would be contrary to the paramount justification for organ donation 
and transplantation – that of saving a life.  Thus, both the lack of ex-
plicit informed consent and the potentially subpar quality of tissues 
and organs procured by way of presumed consent present significant 
medical ethics barriers to the widespread implementation of pre-
sumed consent laws in the United States. 
D. Religious Liberty 
The question of whether organ donation is objectionable on reli-
gious grounds seems simple enough, but the answer apparently is not.  
Depending on which source you reference, you get one of three an-
swers: (1) all/most major religions approve of organ donation,181 (2) 
some religions flat out prohibit organ donation,182 and (3) some reli-
                                                                                                                           
 174 It is well-known that during the Holocaust, concentration camp prisoners were subject-
ed to medical research experiments against their will.  For more information and photographs, 
see Holocaust Encyclopedia, Nazi Medical Experiments, THE UNITED STATES HOLOCAUST 
MEMORIAL MUSEUM, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php? ModuleId 
=10005168 (last visited Mar. 6, 2011); see also  Goodwin, supra note 149, at ¶ 37. 
 175 See Goodwin, supra note 149, at ¶ 37. 
 176 See OFFICE OF HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH, supra note 172. 
 177 See Goodwin, supra note 149, at ¶¶ 39-42. 
 178 Id. at ¶ 39. 
 179 See supra Section IV.B. 
 180 See Goodwin, supra note 149, at ¶¶ 39, 41. 
 181 See Common Myths of Organ Donation, UNOS, http://www.unos.org/ 
donation/index.php?topic=fact_sheet_7 (last visited Aug. 15, 2012); Mayo Clinic Staff, Consum-
er Health, In-Depth, Organ Donation: Don’t Let These Myths Confuse You, 
MAYOCLINIC.COM, http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/organ-donation/FL00077 (last visited 
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http://donatelife.net/Understanding 
Donation/LearnTheFacts.php (last visited Aug. 15, 2012). 
 182 See O’Keeffe, supra note 150, at 292 (“In the Middle East, religious precepts discourage 
and in some places prohibit cadaveric organ donation.”) (quoting the Bellagio Task Force Re-
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gions that traditionally objected to organ donation now approve of it 
as “an act of charity.” 183  Even this seems like an oversimplification, 
however, since some religions remain split on the issue.184  Further 
complicating the issue is the fact that most people’s religious beliefs 
are highly influenced by their cultural and moral beliefs as well.185  
Simply put – religion is personal.  Thus, within a given religion, you 
may find some individuals who object to organ donation and others 
who do not.186 
Confusion aside, it is clear that for some people, objections to ca-
daveric organ donation are grounded in their religious beliefs and 
traditions.  For such people, presumed consent laws are a direct af-
front to religious liberty because they “burden[] . . . free exercise of 
religion by precluding quintessentially religious burial rites.”187 
The case of You Vang Yang v. Sturner188 is illustrative here.  The 
Yangs, who lived in Rhode Island, were members of the Hmong reli-
gion.189  The Hmong religion “prohibits any mutilation of the body, 
including autopsies or the removal of organs during an autopsy.”190  
When the Yangs’ twenty-three year-old son unexpectedly died at a 
Rhode Island hospital, his body, pursuant to a state statute, was trans-
ferred to the state medical examiners’ office for investigation into his 
unexplained death.191  The chief medical examiner then proceeded to 
perform an autopsy on the Yangs’ son without their knowledge or 
                                                                                                                           
port on Transplantation, Bodily Integrity, and the International Traffic in Organs).  The two 
main religious objections to cadaveric organ donation involve the concepts of brain death and 
bodily integrity.  See id. at 292-93.  For instance, many religions do not recognize brain death as 
the sole indicator of death.  Id.  Thus, “for followers of these traditions, extraction of organs 
from a “brain dead” individual [whose heart and lungs are still functioning] constitutes live 
dismemberment or murder.”  Id. at 292.  Moreover, many religions view death holistically, in-
volving both the body and the soul.  Id. at 292.  Accordingly, for such religions, it is often para-
mount that the integrity of the body be maintained for burial.  Id.     
 183 See id. at 292; see also UNOS, supra note 181; DONATELIFE.NET, supra note 181. 
 184 See O’Keeffe, supra note 150, at 292 (“[A]lthough many religious leaders have sanc-
tioned organ donation as a gift of life, others continue to object to the practice.”). 
 185 See Allison Pond, Myths About Religion and Organ Donation Create Hesitation, 
DESERET NEWS, Aug. 5, 2011, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700168701/Myths-about-
religion-and-organ-donation-cause-hesitation.html?pg=all (last visited Aug. 15, 2012), 
 186 See O’Keeffe, supra note 150, at 292-93 (“‘[S]ome Orthodox Jewish rabbis sanction 
cadaveric donation . . . . However, others reject the principle of brain death (equating it with 
murder), thereby making organ retrieval almost impossible.”) (quoting Bellagio Task Force 
Report on Transplantation, Bodily Integrity, and the International Traffic in Human Organs). 
 187 See id. at 289. 
 188 728 F. Supp. 845 (D.R.I. 1990) (Yang I), opinion withdrawn by You Vang Yang v. 
Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558 (D.R.I. 1990) (Yang II). 
 189 See Yang I, 728 F. Supp. at 846; Goodwin, supra note 149, at ¶ 38. 
 190 Yang I, 728 F. Supp. at 846. 
 191 See id.  
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consent.192  The Yangs subsequently brought suit against the chief 
medical examiner claiming that, among other things, the state statute 
that compelled their son’s autopsy violated their First Amendment 
right to the free exercise of their religion.193  Under the then-
applicable strict scrutiny standard of review,194 the district court ruled 
in favor of the Yangs on their First Amendment claim.195  The Yangs’ 
triumph was short-lived, however, as the district court was forced to 
withdraw its initial opinion in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon 
v. Smith,196 which held that “generally-applicable, religion-neutral laws 
that have the effect of burdening a particular religious practice need 
not be justified by a compelling governmental interest . . . .”197  The 
Smith decision was not received well by Congress, however, and in 
1993, Congress attempted to undue its effect and re-implement the 
strict scrutiny standard of review for free exercise challenges by pass-
ing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).198  Federalism 
concerns subsequently prompted the Supreme Court to hold the 
RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the states in City of Boerne v. 
Flores.199  Significantly, however, Flores did not prevent the states 
from enacting their own state versions of the RFRA.  Indeed, as of 
2002, eleven states have done so.200 
The point of this discussion is two-fold: (1) the Yang case serves 
as a sobering example of the dangers presumed consent laws could 
pose to the religious liberties of those who object to cadaveric organ 
donation;201 and (2) because several states have enacted their own 
RFRA’s, free exercise challenges to state presumed consent laws are 
not only viable, but likely.  
                                                                                                                           
 192 See id. 
 193 See id. at 847. 
 194 See id. at 855-56. 
 195 See id. at 857. 
 196 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 197 You Vang Yang v. Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558, 559 (D.R.I. 1990) (Yang II) (quoting 
Smith, 494 U.S. at 1604 n.3).  
 198 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1 to -4 (Supp. V 1993). 
 199 521 U.S. 507 (1997). See also O’Keeffe, supra note 150, at 303 (“[The RFRA] continues 
to apply to the federal government.”). 
 200 See id. at 303.   
 201 Although the dispute in Yang I involved an unconsented-to autopsy, it is not difficult to 
imagine this same scenario playing out with regard to an unconsented-to organ procurement. 
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E. The Alternatives 
1. Combatting the Misconceptions 
Most commentators agree that some commonly held misconcep-
tions about organ donation contribute to the organ shortage in the 
United States.202  Thus, all that may be needed to increase the organ 
donation rate in the United States is increased public education and 
awareness about organ donation.203 
a. Religion 
As discussed in Section IV, opinions vary as to the acceptance of 
cadaveric organ donation among the various religious traditions.  It is 
apparent, however, that at least some major religions do not prohibit 
cadaveric organ donation, but rather embrace it as an act of charity.204  
Still, many people in the United States believe that their religion pro-
hibits or frowns upon organ donation.205  Thus, increased education 
and awareness concerning religious attitudes towards organ donation 
would certainly help to combat this common misconception. 
b. A Culture of Distrust 
A lack of public trust in the American healthcare system is 
viewed as another obstacle to improving the organ donation rate in 
the United States.206  As demonstrated in the recent debates surround-
ing “Obamacare,” this lack of trust can lead to public fear.207  Many 
individuals still fear that their status as an organ donor will impact the 
quality of medical care they will receive in life-threatening situa-
tions.208  Further, as discussed in Section IV, abuse of medical research 
                                                                                                                           
 202 See Busting the Myths About Organ Donation, GIFT OF LIFE DONOR PROGRAM, 
http://www.donors1.org/learn/myths/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2012). 
 203 See id.; Watkins, supra note 8, at 6; Fitzgibbons supra note 4, at 85; see also About Us , 
supra note 17; see also Awareness & Promotion, supra note 17. 
 204 See O’Keeffe, supra note 150, at 292; UNOS, supra note 181; DONATELIFE.NET, supra 
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 205 See UNOS, supra note 181. 
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 207 See Ram, supra note 206. 
 208 See Sayani, supra note 103; UNOS, supra note 181. 
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in the past has resulted in widespread mistrust of the medical estab-
lishment within certain racial and cultural groups.   
c. Brain Death 
Misconceptions surrounding the concept of brain death also act 
as an impediment to increasing the organ donation rate in the United 
States.209  Polls show that people still refuse to donate a loved one’s 
organs when the loved one has been declared brain dead because they 
are under the mistaken belief that a person can “recover” from a di-
agnosis of brain death.210  In reality, however, brain death is irreversi-
ble and serves, in many jurisdictions, as a legal indicator of death.211  
Thus, increased public awareness and education about brain death 
may result in the availability of an entirely new pool of organ do-
nors.212 
2. Financial Incentives 
Beyond presumed consent and increasing awareness of organ 
donation, financial incentives present another means of increasing 
organ donation.  Financial incentives are an attractive option because 
they offer a variety of choice.  Indeed, states have employed various 
types of financial incentives aimed at encouraging organ donation, 
specifically from the perspective of eliciting family members’ con-
sent.213  Pennsylvania piloted a program whereby a family consenting 
to the donation of a decedent’s organ(s) was given $300 towards a 
funeral home of choice.214  Other proposals have included tax credits 
for those who consent to donation.215  Of course, financial incentives 
raise ethical concerns and fears of exploitation.  However, financial 
incentives raise considerably less concerns than their controversial 
counterpart, the organ market. 
A Regulated Organ Market216 
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Since federal law prohibits the sale of organs, a regulated organ 
market is not currently a realistic option for the United States.217  
There are those, however, that think it is time for Congress to re-
think, or even repeal, the prohibition on the sale of organs in light of 
the organ donor crisis.218  However, the idea of a regulated organ mar-
ket is not popular with Americans,219 and their experiences are both 
cautionary and illuminating.  The sale of human organs has, at one 
time or another, been legal in three countries—the Philippines, India, 
and Iran.220  Due to ethical concerns, India’s legal organ market was 
brought to an end in 1994 with the passage of the Transplantation of 
Human Organs Act.221  Similarly, the Philippines maintained a legal 
organ market until the passage of the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act 
in 2009.222  In Iran, however, the organ market is alive and well.223  In 
fact, Iran’s legal kidney market is viewed by some as an example of 
what a well-regulated and standardized legal organ market could look 
like in the United States.224  Although, obviously not a perfect system, 
Iran’s legal kidney market has been successful.225  Perhaps the greatest 
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178 FIU Law Review [7:149 
proof of its success is the fact that, as of 1999, Iran had eliminated its 
waiting list for kidney transplants.226   
Under the Iranian system, paid kidney donors (“kidney ven-
dors”) are identified and matched to recipients by the Dialysis and 
Transplant Patients Association (DATPA).227  DATPA is staffed by 
volunteers and receives no compensation for facilitating the matching 
program.228  Thus, DATPA serves the important role of neutral inter-
mediary between the kidney vendors and transplant recipients.229  
Kidney vendors are paid a flat fee of $1,200 from the Iranian govern-
ment for the donation of a kidney.230  They are also given limited 
health insurance policies to cover only those medical issues that arise 
secondary to the transplantation surgery.231  Moreover, kidney vendors 
receive a second payment – typically between $2,300 and $4,500 –from 
either the recipient, if s/he can afford it, or a designated charitable 
organization.232  The compensation to the kidney vendor, however, is 
not solely monetary.233  The Iranian government also pays for all 
transplant-associated medical care, for both the kidney vendor and 
the recipient.234 
The Iranian experience with organ markets is enlightening in two 
ways.  First, while the Iranian legal kidney market pertains only to 
living kidney vendors, it is not difficult to imagine such a system being 
implemented for deceased donors as well.235  Second, a cursory ac-
counting of the pros and cons of the Iranian kidney market reveals 
that it presents no worse an alternative and about the same risks as an 
explicit consent system, and perhaps a better alternative and fewer 
risks than a presumed consent system.  For instance, the Iranian kid-
ney market relies on the explicit consent of kidney vendors.236  Thus, it 
preserves individual autonomy and privacy at least as well as an ex-
plicit consent system, and certainly better than a presumed consent 
                                                                                                                           
 226 See id. at 4. 
 227 See id. at 3. 
 228 See id. 
 229 See id. at 3-4.  (“Neither the transplant center nor transplant physicians are involved in 
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 230 See id.  
 231 See id.  These limited health insurance policies are in effect for one year following the 
transplantation surgery.  See id. 
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system.  Further, at worst, it raises the same ethical concerns with re-
spect to disparate impact and exploitation of the poor as does pre-
sumed consent.237   
Moreover, despite the fact that many Americans morally object 
to the idea of an organ market, one must admit that it comports nicely 
with the notion of capitalism and the American market economy.  
Thus, with the proper safeguards and regulations in place, a legal or-
gan market may prove to be a missed opportunity for increasing organ 
donation rates in the United States. 
3. Reciprocity in Israel 
Israel recently became the first country in the world to incentiv-
ize organ donation by implementing a reciprocal organ donation sys-
tem.238  Under such a system, individuals who consent to being organ 
donors are given priority over those who do not if they ever find 
themselves in the unfortunate position of needing an organ transplant 
themselves.239  Israeli officials hope that the prospect of receiving pri-
ority treatment is a sufficient incentive to increase Israel’s low organ 
donation rates.240   
V. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PRESUMED CONSENT 
A. The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause 
Under the Court’s modern interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause, whenever the government deprives 
a person of life, liberty, or property, the government must offer that 
person some sort of procedural due process, i.e., notice and the right 
to be heard.241  The property interests protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment are not created by the Constitution.242  Rather, they are 
the products of rules and understandings established by independent 
sources — such as state law, common policy and practice, or prece-
dent.243  However, the liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth 
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 238 See Rampell, supra note 19; Appel, supra note 47. 
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Amendment find their source in both state law and the Constitution.244  
Presumed consent organ donation laws implicate deprivations of both 
liberty and property.  Thus, in examining the constitutionality of pre-
sumed consent organ donation laws under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, one must first address the question of whether presumed con-
sent laws have the potential to deprive people of either liberty or 
property.245  If the answer to this question is yes, the next question 
must then be what process is due?246  As discussed below, several 
courts have had occasion to pass on the first question with varying 
results.247  Nevertheless, some courts have concluded that next-of-kin 
have cognizable and protected property interests in a decedent’s 
body.248  These precedents will undoubtedly provide the predominant 
basis for objections to presumed consent organ donation laws as a 
deprivation of property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process Clause. 
1. The Property Interest of Next of Kin 
In Brotherton v. Cleveland, the decedent’s wife brought suit 
against the county coroner after discovering that her deceased hus-
band’s corneas had been removed during an autopsy without her con-
sent.249  At the hospital, the wife declined to give consent to the dona-
tion of her husband’s organs.250  Subsequently, because the husband’s 
death was ruled a possible suicide, his body was taken to the county 
coroner’s office where an autopsy was performed.251  During the au-
topsy, the county coroner authorized, pursuant to an Ohio presumed 
consent law, the removal of the husband’s corneas for the purposes of 
donation.252  The coroner did not make any effort to ask either the 
decedent’s wife or the hospital whether there was any objection to 
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such a donation.253  The Ohio presumed consent law, under which the 
coroner acted, allowed for the removal of corneas for transplantation 
as long as the coroner’s office was not aware “of an objection by the 
decedent, the decedent’s spouse, or [ ]. . . the next of kin . . . .”254  Fur-
ther, it had become the common practice of the coroner’s office to not 
seek out the next of kin’s consent or inspect the decedent’s medical or 
hospital records.255 
In addressing the wife’s due process claim, the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals first pointed out that historically, other courts have 
found that next of kin have a “quasi-property interest” in a decedent’s 
dead body.256  Nevertheless, the court found that it was unnecessary to 
address the merits of this finding.257  Instead, the court concluded that 
section 2108.02(B) of the Ohio statutes granted an explicit right to the 
decedent’s wife to control the disposal of her husband’s body.258  In so 
doing, the court found that the statute effectively gave the decedent’s 
wife a possessory interest in her husband’s dead body which rose to a 
sufficient level as to create a “‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ . . . pro-
tected by the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause of the [F]ourteenth Amend-
ment.”259  Further, although acknowledging that the right to possess is 
at “the very core of a property interest,”260 the court emphasized that 
the question of whether an interest rises to the level of due process 
protection rests on the substance of the right rather than the label 
attached to it by the State.261  Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit’s holding 
was significant in that it (1) acknowledged that next of kin have a cog-
nizable and constitutionally protected interest in a decedent’s dead 
body, and (2) that this interest is substantial enough to warrant some 
form of predeprivation process under the Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process Clause.262  However, the court did not elaborate as to 
what this predeprivation process should look like or how extensive it 
should be.263 
Similarly, in Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, the Ninth Circuit held 
that the parents of children whose corneas had been removed by the 
Los Angeles County Coroner’s office, without consent and pursuant 
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to a California presumed consent law, stated a valid claim under Title 
42, United States Code, section 1983 for violation of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.264   
However, where the Brotherton court had been hesitant to put a 
label on the interest it deemed worthy of due process protection, the 
Newman court explicitly recognized that a next-of-kin’s exclusive 
right to possess a decedent’s dead body directly translated into a cog-
nizable and constitutionally protected property interest.265  Yet, as in 
Brotherton, the Newman court stopped short of explaining “the type 
and extent of predeprivation process” due.266   
In addition, the Newman case is significant for another reason – 
its factual underpinnings aptly demonstrate the potential for abuse 
posed by presumed consent laws.  The Newman case arose out of an 
exposé in the Los Angeles Times chronicling the Los Angeles County 
Coroner’s rather sketchy practices surrounding presumed consent 
cornea donations.267  Not only did the article reveal that the coroner 
went out of his way to avoid any knowledge of next-of-kin objections, 
it also revealed that the primary motivation for such practices was 
monetary.268  The coroner’s office was selling the corneas to a for-
profit tissue bank and earning approximately $250,000 per year by 
doing so.269 
Nineteen years later, in Albrecht v. Treon, the Sixth Circuit rein-
forced the significance of Brotherton  for the purpose of analyzing the 
constitutionality of presumed consent organ donation laws.  Although 
it declined to extend Brotherton beyond the scope of the organ dona-
tion context,270 the Albrecht court clarified any doubt as to the nature 
of the interest the Brotherton Court had seen fit to protect.271  Accord-
ing to the Albrecht court, the property interest protected in Brother-
ton arose directly from Ohio state law, “which expressly granted next 
of kin the right to [possess and] dispose of a relative’s remains.”272  
Further, the Albrecht court explained that, within the organ donation 
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context, the next of kin’s property interests in the decedent’s dead 
body were paramount to any state property interests that existed.273  
Finally, the Albrecht court repeatedly distinguished Brotherton and 
emphasized that its seemingly contrary holding turned on one “key 
difference.” 274  Whereas the removal of the brain in Albrecht was “in 
furtherance of a lawful criminal investigation,”275 there was no such 
investigative purpose behind the removal of the corneas in Brother-
ton.  Rather, in Brotherton, the corneas were removed for the sole 
purpose of organ donation.276  Accordingly, Brotherton not only re-
mains good law but has been fortified by Albrecht.277  Consequently, it 
will inevitably serve as the launching point for the many constitutional 
challenges that are sure to be mounted against presumed consent or-
gan donation laws. 
B. The Liberty Interest of the Deceased 
Although the liberty interest of the deceased has been focused 
upon less frequently by claimants and the courts, it remains a viable, 
though perhaps tenuous, means of challenging the constitutionality of 
presumed consent laws.  Inherently linked to autonomy, the policy 
side of the liberty argument was discussed above in Section IV.  Here, 
it is worthwhile to examine the constitutional side of the liberty argu-
ment. 
In a seemingly insignificant part of its opinion, the Newman court 
actually seems to give a preview of how the liberty argument could 
play-out from the constitutional law perspective.278  Personal liberty, 
the court points out, “is so rooted in the traditions and conscience of 
our people279 . . . as to be ranked as one of the fundamental liberties 
protected by the substantive component of the Due Process 
Clause.”280  The court further explains that, according to the United 
States Supreme Court, this sphere of personal liberty includes “the 
right of every individual to the possession and control of his own per-
son, free from all restraint or interference of others . . . .”281  Moreover, 
the court notes that the Supreme Court has “strongly suggested” that 
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this protected liberty interest “extends to the personal decisions about 
how to best protect dignity and independence at the end of life.”282  
Thus, according to Newman, one may not need to rely on a next-of-
kin objection in order to mount an attack against presumed consent 
laws.  If personal liberty is indeed a fundamental right, it carries with 
it the full force of our constitutional protections by way of a strict 
scrutiny standard of review.  And if personal liberty encompasses end 
of life decisions, such as organ donation, then laws pertaining to organ 
donation must withstand strict scrutiny review, i.e., the laws must be 
narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest.283 
Another aspect of the liberty argument against presumed consent 
laws is provided by the fact that fundamental rights need not be af-
firmatively invoked.284  By their very nature, fundamental rights are a 
constitutional given, as is the protection they receive.285  If, as dis-
cussed above, the personal liberty with which organ donation laws are 
concerned is a fundamental right, a presumed consent organ donation 
system stands in direct contradiction to this tenet of constitutional 
law.  Under a presumed consent system, an individual’s default status 
becomes constitutionally unprotected unless s/he affirmatively in-
vokes or activates the protection of the Due Process Clause by “opt-
ing-out.”  This proposition flies directly in the face of Supreme Court 
precedents interpreting the nature of the fundamental rights protect-
ed by the Federal Constitution.286   
C. The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause 
In addition, the recognition of next-of-kins’ property interests in 
the dead body of a decedent has obvious implications under the Tak-
ings Clause of the incorporated Fifth Amendment.287  The Takings 
Clause provides that private property shall not “be taken for public 
use, without just compensation.”288  Assuming arguendo that a dece-
dent’s body is the private property of the next-of-kin, one could cer-
tainly argue that presumed consent laws, which authorize the removal 
of a decedent’s organ(s) for the purpose of organ donation without 
compensation to the next-of-kin, constitute a “taking” under the Fifth 
Amendment.  The “public use” requirement of the Takings Clause 
                                                                                                                           
 282 See id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)).  
 283 See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 284 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 525 (1999) 
 285 See Johnson, 304 U.S. at 458; Saenz, 526 U.S. at 489. 
 286 See Johnson, 304 U.S. at 458; Saenz, 526 U.S. at 489. 
 287 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 
226, 233-34 (1897) 
 288 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
2011] No Means No, But Silence Means Yes? 185 
can be satisfied by an expressed intent that the “taking” serve a gen-
eralized “public purpose”. 289  Presumably then, the public purpose in 
the context of presumed consent organ donation laws would be that of 
increasing cadaveric organ donation rates, with the end result being 
that more lives are saved.   
In this scenario, a state government’s only means of avoiding the 
“takings” problem would be to compensate the affected decedent’s 
next of kin.  However, such a proposal would raise many controversial 
questions.  How would a decedent’s organs be valuated, according to 
the value assigned to them by the State, the decedent, the decedent’s 
next of kin, or the organ recipient?  Should the valuation be done pre 
or post death?  Should organ values be uniform by type, regardless of 
the identity of the donor?  Or should who the donor is factor into the 
valuation?  If so, what factors should be considered in the valuation of 
an organ?  Race?  Sex?  Religion?  How about a decedent’s level of 
education, earning potential, or family history?  Certainly, the age and 
overall health of the decedent should be taken into account since such 
characteristics may contribute significantly to the quality of the pro-
cured organ.   
But what role, if any, should the identity of the organ recipient 
play?  Should the value of the life potentially saved factor into the 
equation?  Should the aforementioned factors also come into play on 
the side of the organ recipient?  Should an organ be valued greater if 
it is going to save the life of a young person versus that of an older 
person?  How about if the organ recipient is married and has children, 
versus an individual who is single and has fewer dependents?  Perhaps 
the difficulties posed by these questions are proof that we should not 
go down the road of “body as property”.  However, as evidenced by 
Brotherton, Newman, and Albrecht, in the area of organ donation 
law, we are not far off this course. 
Notably, in the little case law that exists in the area, courts have 
managed to avoid the mere mention of the looming Takings Clause 
problem.290  Perhaps this is wishful thinking on their part.  Neverthe-
less, if attempts like the one in New York gain traction and succeed, 
courts will undoubtedly be forced to address the question of whether 
the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause protects “quasi” property 
rights, as it does fully vested property rights. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Is presumed consent the answer to the organ shortage crisis in 
the United States?  And even if it is, is it an answer that will be ac-
ceptable to the American people?  Moreover, considering the inequi-
ties that have plagued presumed consent laws thus far, is it a just an-
swer?   
As things stand right now, the answer to all of these questions is 
most likely no.  The American people cherish their autonomy and 
privacy too much to view presumed consent laws as anything other 
than a direct affront to their personal liberty.  And while the Ameri-
can courts may be more receptive to presumed consent laws as a valid 
exercise of the state police powers, they inevitably will have to deal 
with some very sticky constitutional issues should state-wide opt-out 
systems become a reality. 
To be sure, there are alternatives.  As offensive as some Ameri-
cans may find the idea of offering financial incentives or remuneration 
for donor organs, such options may prove more palatable and con-
sistent with American values than presumed consent.  Reciprocity 
also seems promising.  Further, increasing the organ donation rates 
may be as simple as increasing education and public awareness about 
organ donation.  In light of the values at stake, the alternatives must 
be worth exploring. 
The future for presumed consent organ donation laws in the 
United States is uncertain.  However, the controversy surrounding 
them is not.  And yet the states seem undeterred in their quest to be 
the first in the nation to boast an opt-out organ donation system.  
Time will only tell. 
 
